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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The above court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(d).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to

set aside a default and default judgment where the court had
previously ordered that Defendant's pleadings be stricken for
being handwritten, and ordered that the Defendant file an
appropriate responsive pleading within ten days; and where the
Defendant, having notice of the requirement that he file an
appropriate answer, failed to do so.
II.

Was the Defendant entitled to prior notice of the entry

of default and default judgment, other than service of the
proposed order striking his pleadings and ordering him to file an
appropriate responsive pleading within ten days.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Mistakes; inadvertence? excusable neglect; newly
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59 (b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the
summons in an action has not been personally served upon the
defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void;
3

(6) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged,
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time
and for reasons (1), (2), (3) or (4), not more than 3 months
after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or
taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect
the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This
rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent action relieve a party from a judgment, order or
proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or
by an independent action.
Rule 55(a)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Notice to party in default. After the entry of the
default of any party, as provided in Subdivision (a)(1) of
this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in
default any notice of action taken or to be taken or to serve
any notice or paper otherwise required by these rules to be
served on a party to the action or proceeding, except as
provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event that it
is necessary to conduct a hearing with regard to the cimount
of damages of the nondefaulting party.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant appeals from the order of the First Circuit
Court denying his motion to set aside default and default
judgment.
A transcript of the hearing on Defendant's motion to set
aside the default and default judgment has been obtained and
references to that transcript shall be made by the page and line
number of that transcript.

All other facts are based upon the

record, ie. the pleadings, papers, etc., which are contained in
the court file.
4

Plaintiff, an attorney, filed a complaint seeking damages for
unpaid services arising out representation of Defendant in a civil
action.

Upon being served, the Defendant filed a handwritten

answer and subsequently a handwritten counterclaim.

Following

this the Defendant filed a handwritten motion to amend his
counterclaim and for summary judgment and a handwritten points and
authorities.

The basis for the amendment to the counterclaim was

that the process server who served the summons and complaint was a
female who had to serve the Defendant in his bedroom due his
physical condition.

Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to strike

Defendant's handwritten pleadings upon the grounds that the carbon
copies which were being sent to Plaintiff were illegible (T-Pg.3L.24).

A hearing was scheduled and notice was sent to the

Defendant.

Defendant did not attend the hearing.

the court granted Plaintifffs motion.

At the hearing

Plaintiff prepared a

proposed order, submitted the original to the court and sent a
copy to the Defendant by mail.

The court then directed Plaintiff

to amend the order to include that Defendant have ten days to file
the appropriate responsive pleading and that if he failed to do
so, default and default judgment would be entered (T-Pg.4-L.7).
This order was signed by the court on December 3, 1987.

Defendant

filed a typed crossclaim and motion for summary judgment on
November 2, 1987.

Plaintiff objected to this motion upon the

grounds that the Defendant had not yet filed an appropriate
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answer, among other reasons.
sent notice to the parties.

The court scheduled a hearing and
Defendant again failed to attend this

hearing and the court denied Defendants motion.

Plaintiff

prepared a proposed order denying summary judgment and again sent
a copy to the Defendant by mail.
December 7, 1987.

This order was signed on

On December 22, 1987 Judge Daines signed the

default judgment, awarding Plaintiff the amounts prayed for in the
complaint.

Defendant who thereafter obtained counsel, filed a

motion to set aside the default and default judgment.
came on for hearing on April 27, 1988.
but his counsel was present.

This matter

Defendant did not appear,

The court denied the motion and this

appeal ensued.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court is vested with considerable discretion in
determining whether or not to vacate a default judgment.

The

decision not to grant this relief will not be overturned on appeal
unless the trial court has abused its discretion.

The Defendant

has the burden of proving that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the motion to set aside the default
judgment.

Not only has the Defendant not shown any abuse of

discretion, but none exists.

The Defendant was served with a copy

of the court's order directing him to file an appropriate
responsive pleading within ten days.

The Defendant was clearly

aware of this order, but instead chose to file a motion for
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summary judgment which he then failed to prosecute.

The court was

correct in holding that there was no excusable neglect on the part
of the Defendant which would justify setting aside the default
judgment.
The

Defendant was not entitled to receive notice that the

court was going to enter default, other than the notice he did
receive in the form of the order striking his pleadings and
ordering him to file a responsive pleading within ten days.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1^
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59 (b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the
summons in an action has not been personally served upon the
defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void;
(6) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged,
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time
and for reasons (1), (2), (3) or (4), not more than 3 months
after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or
taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect
7

the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This
rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent action relieve a party from a judgment, order or
proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or
by an independent action.
In Heath v^ Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (Utah, 1976) the court at
page 858 stated that:
Whether a trial court should set aside a default
judgment is largely a discretionary matter, and we will
reverse a court's ruling only if it is clear that the court
abused that discretion.
See also Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741
(1953); Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513
P.2d 429 (1973); and Pitman v. Bonham, 677 P.2d 1126 (Utah, 1984).
The Defendant in his brief does not demonstrate how the court
abused its discretion in denying the motion to set aside default
judgment; and furthermore the record itself does not reveal that
the trial court clearly abused its discretion in refusing to do
so.

The basis for entering a default judgment was a previous

order of the court striking Defendant's pleadings upon the grounds
that they were handwritten and that the Defendant was sending
carbon copies to the Plaintiff which were illegible (T.-Pg.3L.24).

The motion to strike was heard on October 21, 1987.

A

proposed order was submitted to the court on October 22, 1987.
That same day a copy of that order was served on Defendant by
mailing it to him.

Subsequently, the court instructed Plaintiff

to amend the order to allow the Defendant ten days to file an
8

appropriate responsive pleading before default judgment would be
entered (T.-Pg.4-L.7).
November 3, 1987.
mail.

This order was submitted to the court on

Again a copy was served on the Defendant by

On November 2, 1987 the Defendant filed a typed pleading

entitled cross complaint, motion for summary judgment.

On

November 12, 1987, after receiving the amended order striking
pleadings, the Defendant filed a pleading entitled points and
authorities.

In this pleading the Defendant states:

A motion for summary judgment may be made by the
defendant with or before (emphasis added) the filing of his
answer.
It is clear from this pleading that the Defendant was aware of the
court's order to file an appropriate answer; and that the
Defendant was electing not to do so, but rather to file a motion
for summary judgment.

The Defendant failed to prosecute this

motion by filing any affidavits in support thereof, or to even
attend the hearing set by the court.

Following this hearing on

November 25, 1987 an order was prepared and submitted to the
court, and a copy was served on the Defendant.
signed on December 7, 1987.

This order was

The default and default judgment were

submitted to the court on December 4, 1987 and the default was
entered on December 18, 1987 and the default judgment signed on
December 22, 1987.

The court in its order of May 11, 1988 found

that there was no excusable neglect on the part of Defendant which
would justify setting aside the default judgment.
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This finding is

amply supported by the record.

The Defendant chose not to file an

answer knowing that the court had ordered him to do so or default
would enter.

The Defendant was actually given more than the ten

days set forth in the order to do so; but again, he chose to file
a motion for summary judgment instead.

A motion which he then

failed to prosecute.
Counsel for the Defendant argued in the motion to set aside
default judgment that the Defendant, while representing himself,
was naive of the legal process; and that the Defendant would be
represented by counsel from then on.

In J.P.W. Enterprises, Inc.,

v. Naef, 604 P. 2d 486 (Utah, 1979) the court, under a somewhat
similar situation, held that the fact the defendant may have been
naive as to the legal process did not justify setting aside the
default judgment when it was apparent that the defendant was aware
of the requirement of filing an answer.

The fact that the

Defendant was represented by counsel did not change the
Defendant's conduct.

The Defendant continued to file pro se

pleadings even after his counsel had entered his appearance.

The

fact of the matter is that the record in the trial court and even
the record in the Court of Appeals indicate that the Defendant has
always done things his way no matter what the law required him to
do.
The Defendant also argues on appeal that the court should not
have entered his default in as much as the pleadings which he had

10

filed should have been sufficient to place the matter at issue•
Not only is this inconsistent with the order of the court that the
Defendant file an appropriate responsive pleading; but it is not a
sufficient reason to set aside the default judgment*

The court in

Katz v^ Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah, 1986) at page 93 stated:
That some basis may exist to set aside the default
does not require the conclusion that the court abused its
discretion in refusing to do so when the facts and
circumstances support refusal.
In this case the court had clearly determined that the Defendant's
pleadings were not acceptable.

The court ordered that the

Defendant file an appropriate responsive pleading; and the
Defendant, being aware of this requirement, determined not to do
so, but rather to file a motion for summary judgment which he then
failed to prosecute.

Clearly these facts and circumstances

support the court's refusal to vacate the default judgment.
POINT II.
THE DEFENDANT RECEIVED NOTICE OF THE COURT'S INTENTION TO
ENTER DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT IF A RESPONSIVE PLEADING WAS
NOT FILED. THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RECEIVE ANY FURTHER
NOTICE UNTIL AFTER JUDGMENT HAD BEEN ENTERED.
The Defendant argues that he should have received notice
prior to the time that the court entered default and default
judgment.

The record clearly shows that the Defendant was served

with a copy of the order striking his pleadings and giving him ten
days within which to file an appropriate answer or default would
be entered.

This is all of the notice to which the Defendant was

11

entitled.

There is no requirement under Utah law that a defendant

receive some special three day notice before a default is entered.
Rule 55(a)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Notice to party in default. After the entry of the
default of any party, as provided in Subdivision (a)(1) of
this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in
default any notice of action taken or to be taken or to serve
any notice or paper otherwise required by these rules to be
served on a party to the action or proceeding, except as
provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event that it
is necessary to conduct a hearing with regard to the amount
of damages of the nondefaulting party.
Rule 58A(d) requires only that once a judgment has been entered,
notice thereof be sent to the defendant.
receive notice of judgment.

The Defendant did

Defendant's notion that he is somehow

entitled to three day advance notice is apparently based upon the
law in another jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant has failed to demonstrate and the record does
not reflect that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in
refusing to set aside a default judgment.

On the contrary the

record reveals ample evidence to sustain the decision of the trial
court.

The Defendant elected not to file an answer when he knew

that it was required.

Instead he filed a motion for summary

judgment which was denied when the Defendant failed to prosecute
it.

The Defendant received all of the notice to which he was

entitled under Utah law.

The decision of the trial court should

be affirmed.
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DATED this

/ ^ A day of December, 1988.

COZ
Michael L. Miller
Plaintiff / Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served four copies of the foregoing
on the Defendant by mailing them postage prepaid to:
Gordon E. Johnson
216 West First North
Brigham City, Utah 84302
DATED this

/£&•

day of December, 1988.

/tS/

,

Carol M. Christensen
ADDENDUM
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Default and Default Judgment
Defendant's Points and Authorities

13

IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
chael L. M i l l e r
orney at Law
5o. Main
). Box 399
gham City, Ut.
102
1)723-1784

BOX ELDER COUNTY, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT
MICHAEL L. MILLER,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND
DEFAULT JUDGMENT

vs .
Civil No. 87 CV 60

GORDON E. JOHNSON,
Defendant.

BE IT KNOWN that this matter having come on for hearing
before the above-entitled court on the 4th day of May 1988; and
the Plaintiff having been present in person and Defendant not
having been present in person, but represented by counsel; and the
court having heard the argument of both parties; and having
reviewed the pleadings on file in this matter; and having found
that there was no excusable neglect on the part of Defendant which
would justify setting aside default and default judgment; now
WHEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
Defendant's motion to set aside default and default judgment be
denied•
DATED th is

//

day of May, 1988.

^^A^y^^
Robert W. Daines-Circuit Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the
foregoing to the attorney for Defendant, postage prepaid, at:

aeu.Miller
neyauaw
. Main
Box 399
lam City, Ut.

JD. Aron Stanton
Attorney at Lav/
255
East 400 South, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
11
11

DATED this S ~ ^ day of May, 1988.

2

IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
a e l L. M i l l e r
ney at Law
. Main
Box 399
am City Ut

>
723-1784

BOX ELDER COUNTY, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT
MICHAEL L. MILLER,
ORDER STRIKING DEFENDANT'S
PLEADINGS

Plaintiff,

GORDON E. JOHNSON,

Civil No. 87 CV 60

Defendant.
BE IT KNOWN that this matter having come on regularly for
hearing on the 21st day of October, 1987 before the above-entitled
court, the Honorable Robert W. Daines presiding; and the Plaintiff
having been present and the Defendant not having been present; and
the court having reviewed the court file in this matter and heard
the argument of Plaintiff; and being fully advised in the
premises; now
WHEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's pleadings
previously filed in this matter are hereby striken.

No further

pleadings or papers from the Defendant which do not conform to
Rule 2.3, Utah Rules of Practice for District and Circuit Courts,
shall be accepted.
DATED this

.day of

., 1987.

BY THE COURT:

ROBERT W. DAINES - CIRCUIT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
iael L. Miller
rney at Law
> Main
Box 399
lam City Ut
2
723 1784

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the
foregoing to the Defendant, postage prepaid, at:
Gordon E. Johnson
216 West 100 North
Brigham City, Utah 84302
DATED this

2AAJL

day of October, 1987.

Michael L. Miller

iael L. Miller
mey at Law
D. Mam
Box 399
•»am City, Ut.
2
I 723-1784

IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
BOX ELDER COUNTY, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT
MICHAEL L. MILLER,
Plaintiff,

ORDER STRIKING DEFENDANT'S
PLEADINGS

vs.
GORDON E. JOHNSON,

Civil No. 87 CV 60

Defendant.
BE IT KNOWN that this matter having come on regularly for
hearing on the 21st day of October, 1987 before the above-entitled
court, the Honroable Robert W. Daines presiding; and the Plaintiff
having been present and the Defendant not having been present; and
the court having reviewed the court file in this matter and heard
the argument of Plaintiff; and being fully advised in the
premises; now
WHEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's pleadings
previously filed in this matter are hereby stricken.

No further

pleadings or papers from the Defendant which do not conform to
Rule 2.3, Utah Rules of Practice for District and Circuit Courts,
shall be accepted.

Defendant shall have ten (10) days from the

date of this order within which to file the appropriate responsive
pleadings, and failing to do so, default and default judgment may
be entered.
DATED t h i s

_day of November, 1987,

BY THE COURT:
Kiel L. M i l l e r
rney at Law
>. Main
Box 399
lam City, Ut.
2
723-1784

ROBERT W. DAINES - CIRCUIT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the
foregoing to the Defendant, postage prepaid, at:
Gordon E. Johnson
216 West 100 North
Brigham City, Utah 84302
DATED this 2nd

day of November, 1987.

fichael L. Miller

IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
ael I . M i l l e r
ley at Law
Main
3ox399
am Oty, Ut
723 1784

BOX ELDER COUNTY, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT
MICHAEL L. MILLER,
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 87 CV 60

GORDON E. JOHNSON,
Defendant.

BE IT KNOWN that in this matter the defendant having been
personally served with a summons and complaint; and thereafter
having filed an answer; and plaintiff having moved to strike said
answer; and the court having granted said motion and ordered that
defendant file an appropriate responsive pleading within ten days;
and defendant having failed to file such a responsive pleading;
now
WHEREFORE the default of defendant is hereby entered as a
matter of law.
DATED this

_day of December, 1987.
By the Clerk of the Court:

Deputy Clerk
DEFAULT JUDGMENT
BE IT KNOWN that in this matter the defendant having been
personally served with a summons and complaint; and thereafter

having filed an answer; and plaintiff having moved to strike said
a e l L. M i l l e r
ney at Law
. Main
Box 399
am City. Ut.

answer; and the court having granted said motion and ordered that
defendant file an appropriate responsive pleading within ten days;

)
723 1784

and defendant having failed to file such a responsive pleading;
and the default of defendant having been entered as a matter of
law; now
WHEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff be and is
hereby awarded judgment against the defendant as follows:
$1,168.75 in principal,
>54.47 in interest accrued to the date of judgment,
$22.00 in costs accrued to the date of judgment,
$1,345.22 total judgment, together with interest thereon at
the rate of 18% per annum until collected and any costs of the
court which accrue hereafter.
DATED this .r^P

clay of December, 1987.
By the Court:

obfert W. Daines - Judge

Wl \l

1
2
3

Gordon E. Johnson
216 West 1st North
Brigham City, Utah
Tel. 801 723-3677
In Propria Persona

84302

4
5

FIRST CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH

6

FOR BOX ELDER .COUNTY

7
8

MICHAEL L. MILLER,

Civil No. 87-60

9

Plaintiff and Cross-defendant,

Points and Authorities

10

November 25, 1987

vs.

11

GORDON E. JOHNSON,

12

Defendant and Cross-Complainant.

13
14

A motion for summary judgment may be made by defendant with or before

15

(emphasis added) the filing of his answer.

16

Protective Assn. (1946) 153 F.2d 209.

17

Gifford vs. Travelerfs

If this motion is denied, defendant incorporates by reference the fee

18

arbitration committee's decision on file herein as his answer. This decision

19

is relevant as it indicates Mr. Miller!s action is meritless.

20
21

Jfly'.Si.^s. ^,CL4^^yr—

Dated Nov. 5, 1987

Gordon £. Johnson

22
23
24
25

Proof of Service
I hereby certify that on the following date I mailed a copy of the
foregoing to Michael L. Miller, 20 South Main St., Brigham City, Utah

26
27

Dated Nov. 9, 1987 at Denver, Colorado

84302

